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Abstract
We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse rm when the rm is imper-
fectly informed about its e¢ ciency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The
rms risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a xed-price contract to a
cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undere¤ort by an ine¢ cient rm
as in Lafont and Tirole (1986) and the e¤ort distortion increases as the rm becomes more
risk-averse. Further, the regulator benets from sequential contracting with the rm where
the rm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benet
diminishes as the rm becomes more risk-averse.
Keywords: Risk-Aversion, Incomplete Information, Regulation
JEL classi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1 Introduction
We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse rm under incomplete and asym-
metric information. The information environment considered here is one in which neither
the rm nor the regulator initially knows with certainty the rms e¢ ciency parameter
for a project. After the regulator and the rm have negotiated a contract, the rm can
discover its e¢ ciency parameter before choosing its cost reduction e¤ort. The regulator can
observe the rms output and production cost but not its e¢ ciency parameter and its cost
reduction e¤ort. Therefore, we study a situation with both adverse selection and moral
hazard for a risk-averse rm.
La¤ont and Tirole (1986) (L&T henceforth) examine the optimal regulatory policy for a
risk-neutral rm who is perfectly and privately informed about its e¢ ciency parameter for a
project at the time of contracting. Our analysis di¤er from L&T in two dimensions. First,
we examine a situation where both the regulator and the rm are imperfectly informed
about the rms e¢ ciency parameter at the time of contracting. We model a sequential
contracting process where the rm chooses contract terms gradually over time as it dis-
covers more information about its e¢ ciency parameter. Second, we examine the optimal
regulatory policy for a risk-averse rm. Therefore, we extend L&T to situations requiring
a simultaneous treatment of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk-sharing, such as the
regulation of small rms.
Dai et al (2006) study how owners optimally contract with risk-neutral managers who
are privately, but imperfectly informed of market conditions at the time of contracting.
They show that the owners ability to benet from a managers expertise depends on the
contracting sequence employed. When all contract terms are negotiated after the manager
has completed his forecast of market conditions, the owner may benet little or not at
all from a managers expertise. On the other hand, when contract terms are determined
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gradually as the manager acquires information about market conditions, the owner always
benets from a managers expertise. In contrast to Dai et al (2006), we examine a sequential
contracting process for a risk-averse manager. Since the sequential contracting process
subjects a manager to uncertainties at the time of contracting, it is interesting to study
the regulators preference for contracting sequence when the manager becomes risk-averse.
La¤ont and Rochet (1998) (L&R henceforth) analyze a similar information environment
to ours for a risk-averse rm. In their model, the contract is also o¤ered and signed before
the rm discovers its e¢ ciency parameter. However, the rm in their model can reject the
contract after observing its e¢ ciency parameter, which makes their model equivalent to
one that the rm is perfectly informed at the time of contracting. Therefore, their model
excludes the benet of sequential contracting.
Sappington (1982) examines the optimal regulatory strategy to promote cost reduction
in a similar information environment but for a risk-neutral rm. Salanié (1990) studies
optimal contracting with a risk-averse agent subject to adverse selection. In contrast, we
study a situation with both adverse selection and moral hazard for a risk-averse rm. Our
analysis permits direct comparisons with L&T and L&R. The comparisons demonstrate
the e¤ects of risk-aversion and sequential contracting.
We show that the rms risk-aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a xed-
price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undere¤ort by
an ine¢ cient rm and the e¤ort distortion increases as the rm becomes more risk-averse.
Further, as the rm becomes more risk-averse, the e¤ort distortion converges to, but is
always smaller than, that in L&R . The nding demonstrates that the regulator benets
from sequential contracting, where the rm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires
information, even when rms are risk-averse. However, the benet does diminish as the
rm becomes more risk-averse. This result extends the nding by Dai et al. (2006) to
settings with risk-averse managers.
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We present the model in Section 2. Section 3 provides our analysis of the optimal reg-
ulatory policy. Section 4 demonstrates the regulators preference for contracting sequence
using a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function. Section 5 discusses the main nd-
ings and concludes the paper with future research directions.
2 Elements of the model
An utilitarian regulator wishes to realize a public project with social value S. A single
rm can realize the project, at a total cost C =    e, where  is the rms e¢ ciency
parameter for the project and e is its managers e¤ort. The managers disutility of e¤ort
is  (e) with  0(e) > 0;  00(e) > 0; and  000(e) > 0. The total production cost is observable
by the regulator and is reimbursed to the rm by the regulator, as in L&T and L&R. The
rm is also compensated by a net monetary transfer t in addition to the reimbursement of
cost. The rms manager is risk-averse and his utility function is U = u(), where u0 > 0,
u00 < 0, and   t   (e).
At the outset, neither the regulator nor the rm knows exactly the rms e¢ ciency
parameter, . However, both of them know  belongs to the two point support

; 
	
with  >  and Pr( = ) = v (therefore Pr( = ) = 1   v). We assume that S is
su¢ ciently large so that it is worth realizing the project regardless of the rms e¢ ciency
parameter. After contracting with the regulator and before determining its cost reduction
e¤ort, the rm privately discovers its  for the project.
With incomplete information regarding , the regulator o¤ers a contract menu speci-
fying a list of transfer-cost pairs that are contingent upon the rms later announcement
of its e¢ ciency parameter, b, namely t(); C()	 for b =  and t(); C()	 for b = .
As is well known, according to the revelation principle, we can restrict our attention to a
truth-telling mechanism that b =  is the rms optimal strategy. For notation simplicity,
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let t  t(), C  C(), t  t(), and C  C().
We assume that the regulator can raise public fund only through a distortionary mech-
anism.  > 0 denote the shadow cost of public funds. The expected consumer surplus is
S  (1+)[v(t+C)+ (1  v)(t+C)]. The certainty equivalent of the risk-averse managers
prot is CE  u 1[vu()+(1 v)u()]. We aggregate the expected consumer surplus with
the certainty equivalent of the managers prot to obtain the expected social welfare:
W = S   (1 + )[v(t+ C) + (1  v)(t+ C)] + u 1[vu() + (1  v)u()] (1)
= S   (1 + )fv[ +  (   C) + C] + (1  v)[ +  (   C) + C]g
+ u 1[vu() + (1  v)u()].
The timing of the model is as follows: 1) The regulator and the rm signs a contract
menu which species a list of transfer-cost pairs that are contingent upon the managers
later announcement, b. 2) After signing the contract, the rm discovers its e¢ ciency
parameter  for the project. 3) The rm announces its e¢ ciency parameter b and takes
the transfer-cost pair depending on its announcement. 4) The rm determines it cost
reduction e¤ort and the production takes place. 5) The total cost is observed and exchange
takes place based on the contract. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to L&T, we specify the
contracting as a sequential process. The rm initially signs a contract menu contingent upon
its later announcement of its e¢ ciency parameter. Then, after discovering its e¢ ciency
parameter, the rm chooses a transfer-cost pair from the initial contract menu depending
on its announcement.
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3 The Optimal regulatory policy
The manager will participate in a contract if and only if his expected utility from the con-
tract is nonnegative. Therefore, the regulatory policy must satisfy the incentive rationality
condition
E(U) = vu() + (1  v)u() > 0: (2)
To guarantee the manager truthfully reveal the rms e¢ ciency parameter for the
project, the transfer-cost pair designed for a type  (respectively a type ) rm must be the
one preferred by a type  (respectively a type ) rm. Notice that e =    C. Therefore,
the regulatory policy must also satisfy the following incentive compatibility conditions:
 = t   (   C) > t   (   C); and (3)
 = t   (   C) > t   (   C): (4)
Dene (e)   (e)    (e   ) where      . Since  00(e) > 0 and  000(e) > 0; it
can be readily shown that 0 > 0 and 00 > 0. The incentive compatibility conditions can
be rewritten as
 >  + (   C); and (5)
 >    (   C): (6)
The regulator wishes to maximize the expected social welfare under incentive rationality
and incentive compatibility conditions. Therefore, the regulators optimization problem is
Max
fC;C;;g
W = S   (1 + )fv[ +  (   C) + C] + (1  v)[ +  (   C) + C]g
+ u 1[vu() + (1  v)u()] (7)
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subject to conditions (2), (5) and (6). Since t    (   C) > t    (   C) = , an
e¢ cient rm ( = ) can always mimic an ine¢ cient one ( = ) with a lower e¤ort
and capture information rent. As explained below, any rent captured by the e¢ cient rm
is costly to the regulator. Therefore, condition (5) must be binding at the optimum. We
momentarily neglect condition (6), and we later check that the solution of the maximization
under conditions (2) and (5) satises condition (6). Therefore, the regulators optimization
problem can be rewritten as
Max
fC;C;g
W = S   (1 + )fv[ + (   C) +  (   C) + C] + (1  v)[ +  (   C) + C]g
+ u 1[vu( + (   C)) + (1  v)u()] (8)
subject to condition (2).
Before proceeding to the solution of the regulators optimization problem (8), it is
useful to characterize, as a benchmark, the optimal regulatory policy when the rm is risk-
neutral. When the rm is risk-neutral, the regulator optimally o¤ers the rm a xed transfer
payment t = v
 
 (   C) + C + (1   v)   (   C) + C regardless of the realization of
its e¢ ciency parameter. The xed transfer payment equals the rms expected cost of
completing the project, which guarantees the rms participation. Given the xed transfer
payment, the rm chooses the optimal amount of e¤ort to reduce the cost of the project.
Consequently, the rm delivers the e¢ cient level of e¤ort regardless of the realization of
its e¢ ciency parameter. Therefore, the optimal regulatory policy possesses the following
features:
E(U) = vu() + (1  v)u() = 0 (9)
 0(e) = 1; and (10)
 0(e) = 1: (11)
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Notice that, when the rm is risk-neutral, it captures no information rent from its private
information about the e¢ ciency parameter.
However, when the rm is risk-averse, the solution to the regulators optimization prob-
lem has the following properties:
E(U) = vu() + (1  v)u() = 0; (12)
 0(e) = 1; and (13)
(1  v)[1   0(e)] = [1 H] v0(e); (14)
where H  1=[(1  v) + v u0()
u0(+(e)) ].
Equation (12) indicates that, in contrast to L&T and L&R, the rm in expectation
receives no rent from its private information.
Note that u0() > u0( + (e)) and H < 1 because u00 < 0. Consequently, equation
(14) shows  0(e) < 1. Therefore, equations (13) and (14) suggest that, under the optimal
regulatory policy, an e¢ cient rm delivers an e¢ cient level of e¤ort but an ine¢ cient rm
delivers a less than e¢ cient level of e¤ort.
This qualitative property of optimal regulatory policy is similar to those in L&T and
L&R. However, the intuitions behind these outcomes are profoundly di¤erent. In L&R,
the rm is privately informed about its e¢ ciency parameter at the time of contracting. An
e¢ cient rm can always mimic an ine¢ cient rm and capture information rent. The rent
(e) is an increasing function of the e¤ort level required from an ine¢ cient rm. Therefore,
the regulator faces a trade-o¤ between production e¢ ciency and rent extraction. To reduce
the costly rent, the regulator optimally lowers the e¤ort level required from an ine¢ cient
rm. In L&R, the rm can reject the initial contract after observing its e¢ ciency parameter,
which makes their model equivalent to one that the rm is perfectly informed at the time
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of contracting. Hence, the regulator balances production e¢ ciency and rent extraction as
in L&T except that the information rent for a risk-averse rm is more socially costly than
that for a risk-neutral rm. Consequently, the optimal regulatory policy entails a larger
e¤ort distortion in L&R than that in L&T.
In this model, at the time of contracting the rm shares the same incomplete information
with the regulator about the rms e¢ ciency parameter. Consequently, although an e¢ cient
rm can capture ex post information rent by mimicking an ine¢ cient rm, the regulator
can fully extract the expected information rent at the time of contracting by adjusting
the level of the transfer payments t and t. Note that only the di¤erence between the
two payments a¤ects the managers decision to truthfully reveal its e¢ ciency parameter.
Therefore, the managers ex post information rent would be costless for the regulator and
e¢ cient outcomes would be achieved as shown earlier, should the manager be risk-neutral.
However, when the manager is risk-averse, the optimal regulatory policy must balance
production e¢ ciency and risk-sharing.
Equation (14) demonstrates the intuition. Raising e by e will increase production
e¢ ciency by (1  v)[1   0(e)]e, but will also increase an e¢ cient rms ex post informa-
tion rent by 0(e)e. When the manager is risk-averse, the regulator can only reduce the
expected transfer payment by v0(e)He in order to keep the managers expected utility
non-negative. As a result, the regulators welfare decreases by [1 H] v0(e)e. At the op-
timum, the regulators marginal benet of raising e must equal her marginal cost of doing
so, which yields equation (14).
Note that when the rm is risk-neutral, i.e., u00 = 0, u0() = u0( + (e)) and H = 1.
Consequently, v0(e)He = v0(e)e, in other words, the regulator can fully recover the
managers expected ex post information rent by reducing the expected transfer payment by
exactly v0(e)e. In that case, the right-hand side of equation (14) becomes 0 and the rm
always delivers the e¢ cient level of e¤ort. On the other hand, when the rm becomes more
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risk-averse, i.e., u00 decreases, u0()=u0( + (e)) increases and H decreases. Consequently,
the right-hand side of equation (14) increases and the ine¢ cient rm delivers a smaller
e¤ort under the optimal regulatory policy. When the rm becomes innitely risk-averse,
H converges to 0. Consequently, equation (14) converges to  0(e) = 1  0(e)v=(1  v).
Note that  0(e) = 1 0(e)v=(1 v)(1+) in L&T. Therefore, when the rm becomes
innitely risk-averse, the outcome converges to the one in L&T as if the regulator in L&T
places no value on the managers utility. This is because of the following two e¤ects.
First, when the manager becomes innitely risk-averse, he participates in the contract
only if he is guaranteed nonnegative utility regardless of the realization of the e¢ ciency
parameter. Therefore, the optimal regulatory policy converges to one where the rm is
perfectly informed about its e¢ ciency parameter at the time of contracting. Second, the
managers ex post information rent becomes a complete waste for both the manager and
the regulator when the manger becomes innitely risk-averse. Therefore, the outcome
converges to one where the regulator places no value on the rms rent.
Note that the neglected condition (6) is satised by this solution. The condition can
be written as  >  + (   C)   (   C) or 0 > (   C)   (   C) which is true
since e < e from equations (13) and (14). We summarize the properties of the optimal
regulatory policy in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Under the optimal regulatory policy: (1) The manager receives no infor-
mation rent in expectation; (2) An e¢ cient rm delivers an e¢ cient level of e¤ort; (3)
An ine¢ cient rm delivers a less than e¢ cient level of e¤ort, and the e¤ort distortion
increases as the rm becomes more risk-averse.
See La¤ont and Tirole (1986) for detailed analysis.
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4 Preference for Contracting Sequence
An interesting example of risk-averse utility function is the constant absolute risk-aversion
(CARA) utility function: u(x) = (1   e x)= with  > 0. The CARA parameterization
allows us to study the change in the optimal regulatory policy when the rms degree of
risk-aversion changes. In addition, it provides a direct comparison between our model and
L&R. The comparison demonstrates the e¤ect of sequential contracting.
With the CARA utility function, equation (14) becomes
 0(e) = 1  v
1  v
0(e)

1  1
v + (1  v)e(e)

: (15)
Di¤erentiating equation (15) with respect to e, , and  provides @e=@ < 0 and
@e=@ < 0. Hence, the e¤ort distortion for an ine¢ cient rm increases as its manager
becomes more risk-averse or the rm becomes relatively more ine¢ cient.
As  converges to 0, i.e., the rm becomes less risk-averse,  0(e) converges to 1. The
regulatory policy converges to a xed price contract. On the other hand, as  converges
to innity, i.e., the rm becomes innitely risk-averse,  0(e) decreases and converges to
1  v0(e)=(1  v), and the regulatory policy shifts towards a cost-plus contract, i.e., a less
powerful incentive scheme.
A direct comparison between our model and L&R demonstrates the e¤ect of sequential
contracting. It can be shown that the e¤ort distortion in our model converges to, but is
always smaller than, that in L&R as  converges to innity.
Proposition 2 The e¤ort distortion for an ine¢ cient rm converges to, but is always
smaller than, that in L&R as the rm becomes more risk-averse.
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Proof. In L&R, the e¤ort level for the ine¢ cient rm is determined by the following
equation:
 0(e) = 1  v
1  v
0(e)


1 + 
+
1
1 + 

1  1
v + (1  v)e(e)

:y (16)
Since  > 0, e(e) > 1: Therefore, 1 > 1
v+(1 v)e(e) > 0 and

1 + 
+
1
1 + 

1  1
v + (1  v)e(e)

>
+ 1
1 + 

1  1
v + (1  v)e(e)

> 1  1
v + (1  v)e(e) . (17)
Then a direct comparison of equations (15) and (16) shows  0(e) >  0(e), i.e., the e¤ort
distortion for the ine¢ cient rm is larger in L&R. As  increases, 1  1=(v + (1  v)e(e))
increases, the di¤erence between the e¤ort distortions in the two models shrinks. When
!1, 1  1=(v + (1  v)e(e)) converges to 1. Consequently,  0(e) converges to  0(e) as
!1.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal regulatory policy entails a smaller e¤ort distortion
when the regulator is able to contract sequentially with the rm so that the rm chooses
contract terms gradually as it acquires information. Therefore, the regulator benets from
sequential contracting. However, the benet of sequential contracting diminishes as the
rm becomes more risk-averse. When the manager becomes innitely risk-averse, to ensure
his participation he must be guaranteed a nonnegative utility for all realizations of its
e¢ ciency parameter. In this case, the benet of sequential contracting disappears and the
outcome becomes equivalent to those in L&R.
ySee La¤ont and Rochet (1998) for detailed analysis.
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5 Conclusion
We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse rm when the rm is imperfectly
informed about its e¢ ciency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The
regulator benets from sequential contracting with the rm where the rm chooses contract
terms gradually as it acquires information, even when the rm is risk-averse. However, the
benet does diminish as the rm becomes more risk-averse. Therefore, we extend Dai et
al. (2006) to settings with risk-averse managers.
Our central insights also shed light on other contractual relationships that require a
simultaneous treatment of adverse selection, moral hazard, and prot sharing, such as
sharecropping, insurance, managerial compensation, etc. For example, buyers of automobile
insurance typically do not have perfect information about their risks of being in an accident,
which could depend on weather conditions, road conditions, tra¢ c conditions, etc., when
they purchase their auto insurances. They determine the amount of care to exert after they
purchase their insurance contracts and are better informed about their potential risks.
Our study abstract from several factors that could be included in future research. First,
although the rms information about its e¢ ciency parameter is imperfect at the time of
contracting, the rm could be better informed than the regulator. In that case, the optimal
regulatory policy must screen the rm not only by its e¢ ciency parameter but also by its
information at the time of contracting regarding its e¢ ciency parameter. Second, we derive
the optimal regulatory policy under the assumption that the regulator has perfect infor-
mation regarding the rms risk-preference. When the regulator has imperfect information
about the rms risk-aversion, the rm conceivably will try to manipulate the regulators
perception of both its risk-aversion and its e¢ ciency parameter . The optimal regulatory
policies in these situations merit further investigation.
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